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ABSTRACT 
 
Information Extraction in an Optical  
Character Recognition Context 
 
by 
  
Ramón Pereda 
 
Dr. Kazem Taghva, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
In this dissertation, we investigate the effectiveness of information extrac-
tion in the presence of Optical Character Recognition (OCR). It is well known 
that the OCR errors have no effects on general retrieval tasks. This is mainly 
due to the redundancy of information in textual documents. Our work 
shows that information extraction task is significantly influenced by OCR 
errors. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that extraction algorithms rely on a 
small window of text surrounding the objects to be extracted. 
We show that extraction methodologies based on the Hidden Markov 
Models are not robust enough to deal with extraction in this noisy environ-
ment. We also show that both precise shallow parsing and fuzzy shallow 
parsing can be used to increase the recall at the price of a significant drop 
in the precision. 
Most of our experimental work deals with the extraction of dates of 
birth and extraction of postal addresses. Both of these specific extractions 
are part of general methods of identification of privacy information in textual 
documents. Privacy information is particularly important when large collec-
tions of documents are posted on the Internet. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation presents an evaluation of information retrieval (IR) 
systems and information extraction (IE) systems in the presence of OCR er-
rors. While the IR systems not designed with OCR errors in mind perform 
robustly, the IE systems do not. The IE systems need to take additional 
measures to counter-act the OCR errors and do so with some measured 
success. Chapter 2 gives an overview of IR and IE. The major technical steps 
in creating OCRed documents are explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 sum-
marizes key research results of the Information Science Research Institute 
(ISRI) regarding the effects of OCR on unmodified IR systems. The methods 
and OCR effects of Hidden Markov Models are explained and experimental 
results described in chapters 5 and 6. In chapters 7 and 8, the methods and 
OCR effects using Precise Shallow Parsing are presented. Chapters 9 and 
10 do the same as the previous two, but for Fuzzy Shallow Parsing. Chap-
ter 11 gives a graphical summary of the IE results and draws some conclu-
sions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL AND EXTRACTION 
Information Retrieval 
Information Retrieval (IR) is predominately the science of searching for text, 
though sometimes it includes audio recordings, images, and video. The fo-
cus of this research is on text. IR has overlapping usage with data retrieval, 
document retrieval, and text retrieval. Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto (1999), 
claim “despite its maturity, until recently, IR was seen as a narrow area of 
interest mainly to librarians and information experts”. The Web brought IR 
to the forefront. 
 IR systems deal with natural language text which is not always well-
formed and often semantically ambiguous. Small errors in an IR systems 
are likely to go unnoticed and be forgiven. The user of an IR system is trying 
to get information about a subject or topic. That intent is expressed in a 
query. The IR system must return documents that are relevant to the query. 
Often the list of potential documents is so large that an exhaustive review is 
not practical; so, the list of returned documents must be ranked in order of 
relevance. 
 Preprocessing on the documents is a central theme to most IR sys-
tems. A data structure called an index is typically built from the documents 
to speed up searching. If we wants to find all documents that contain a 
phrase or word, we could sequentially search all the documents but an in-
dex allows for a much quicker search. A process called stemming is used to 
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reduce words to their grammatical roots. For example, “fishing”, “fished”, 
“fish”, and “fisher” all reduce to the root word “fish”. Extremely common 
words are not distinctive enough for search collections of any significant 
size. These common words are called stopwords. Examples are “a”, “the”, 
“should”, “would”, “but”, and “because”. These words are often removed 
from consideration during the search process. Other times, they might be 
allowed for full phrase searching as in “to be or not to be”. Identifying the 
key phrases in a document is far from a solved problem but central to many 
IR systems. These are but a few of the many document processing steps 
that make up a success IR systems. 
Information Extraction 
Information extraction (IE) structures the text within documents into se-
mantically useful information. Human language is marvelously complex and 
so typical IE systems make incremental improvements towards understand-
ing the information within documents. The simplest piece of information is 
an attribute-value pair, such as the company-name label and a particular 
company. An example attribute-value pair would be company-name(“Joe’s 
Bike Shop”). Named-entity extraction is the technical term for identifying 
these phrases in text with a useful label for the instance. The next level of 
abstraction is a relation, such as wrote(author, book). Wrote is the name of 
the relation, and author and book are the fields. This is conceptually the 
same relation notion used in a relational database, though relations might 
be stored using a completely different type of database. Particular instances 
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of a relation are sometimes thought of as facts. So, wrote(“Charles Darwin”, 
“Origin of Species”) is a fact that might be extracted from a encyclopedia en-
try. Some information can be readily synthesized given a collection of facts. 
For example, given the attribute values for key-sentence, these could be 
ordered and used as a crude but useful summary of a document. The rela-
tion friend(person1, person2) could be used to generate a social graph of a 
group of people. There are many useful and sophisticated models for build-
ing systems from relations. However, the extracting of relation instances 
remains the hard problem of IE.  
 Documents are largely invisible to many information systems. Con-
sider viewing online classified ads as a large collection of small documents. 
Reading 50 ads might take half an hour. The useful attributes and relations 
are buried inside of complex but not random text. Compare that task to the 
task of online shopping at Amazon.com or better yet Zappos.com. Shopping 
with a database is a much more efficient task. In seconds, you can find out 
if there is a size nine, extra wide, low-profile running shoe. Detailed search-
ing inside of classified ads such as those in eBay or Craig’s List is not as 
scalable of a task.  
 Tim Berners-Lee, an inventor of the world-wide web, is leading a pro-
ject called the Semantic Web (Bizer, Heath, & Berners-Lee, 2009). The Web 
started out a web of documents. These documents are intended for human 
consumption. The Web of Data is a growing part of the Web that has billions 
of assertions, or bits of data, linked together. These links are intended to be 
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reliable and machine readable. The Semantic Web project is establishing 
best practices for publishing and connecting data on the web. IR systems, 
aka search engines, will adapt to the evolving web. IE systems will auto-
matically sift out the data of documents, allowing the data and not just the 
document to be published. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SCANNING, OCR, AND DIGITIZING 
The process of converting a physical printed item into an electronic docu-
ment is commonly referred to as digitizing. This process is more commonly 
done in reverse in the form of printing an electronic document. Conceptu-
ally, the digitizing can be divided into three stages: page scanning, block 
zoning, and text recognition. 
 Scanning means taking a special digital picture of a sheet of paper. 
This picture is taken with an optical scanner, which senses variations in 
light intensity used to construct a bit-map image. This image is often black 
and white with 1’s for representing black pixels and 0’s for representing 
white pixels. 
 Block zoning is the process of dividing up the pages into different logi-
cal areas (blocks), that are typically rectangular. These blocks must be or-
dered to preserve the anticipated reading order. As a simple example, if the 
page is formatted in two columns, the page must be divided into two blocks 
with the left one ordered before the right one for English text. 
 Text recognition is the process of converting text blocks into com-
puter-encode characters, no different than if they had been hand-typed into 
an electronic document. Typically, the portion of the image identifying a sin-
gle character is individually segmented and translated into its computer-
encoded character equivalent. For state-of-the-art OCR systems, the accu-
rate recognition of English Latin-script text from high quality scanning is 
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comparable to what humans can do. The state-of-the-art has not advanced 
much in the last decade, but that art is also somewhat of a black art in that 
the best software applications are commercial and closed to outside techni-
cal inspection. The best open source solution for studying detailed OCR sys-
tems is perhaps Tesseract (2010), which was given to Google by ISRI. 
 Many errors that are generated by OCR systems can be traced back to 
low quality scanning or deteriorated printed materials. Sometimes that 
original physical paper is no longer available to re-do the scanning. Below 
are two examples of poor quality scans and one example of a reasonable 
scan. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Deteriorated printed page. Notice the broken characters. 
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Figure 3.2 Poorly scanned page. Notice the page is not aligned and the left 
side of the page is bent back. 
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Figure 3.3 Typical scanned page.
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF OCR ERRORS ON RETRIEVAL 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we review three information retrieval (IR) systems working 
with OCRed document collections. The metrics used to compare the result 
set for the OCRed collections with the result set for the corrected collections 
are different for each IR system. Part of this is due to the fact that the prob-
abilistic and vector space models systems produce a ranking of the results; 
the boolean system produces an unordered result set. The most detailed 
level of granularity is used in the metrics for probabilistic system, which is 
tested on three document collections of varying OCR quality. For the vector 
space model, only a summarized and condense version of the results is pre-
sented. However, there were ten variation of the vector space model’s key 
parameters used in the study. All three of these studies are covered in the 
paper by Taghva, Borsack, and Condit (1996b). 
Effects Of OCR Errors On Boolean IR 
A document collection from the Department of Energy containing 204 doc-
uments was given to the researchers (Taghva, Borsack, Condit, & Erva, 
1994). These scientific documents contained formulas, graphs, photos, and 
maps. There were sixteen major subject areas. A level of 99.8% character 
accuracy was reported for the collection.  
The collection was loaded into the BASIS Plus information retrival 
system (Delphi Consulting Group, 1991). It was originally developed by In-
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formation Dimensions Inc. of Dublin, Ohio, which was acquired by Open 
Text Corporation in 1998. The boolean logic with an inverted file model has 
been (Salton, 1989) and still is the most widely used technology as seen in 
the Google search engine (Brin & Page, 1998). Querying this type of infor-
mation retrieval system is so popular it has become an English verb: goo-
gling. 
There were 205 unique search terms for the seventy-one queries. The 
average number of terms per query was five. If we count the number of que-
ries that return exactly the same result set documents, we have 63. That 
means 88.8% of the queries return identical results. 
If we take a closer look at the results sets, and count the number of 
correct documents retrieved across all the queries, 617 out of a possible 
632, the results are even closer. That means 97.6% of documents are  re-
trieved. We consider a 95% or better recall statistically the same as the 
100% recall for the clean text.  
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Figure 4.1 Boolean Model: recall by query and by document 
 
All the statistical studies in this dissertation assume a level of signifi-
cance (α) of 5%. Choosing the level of significance is somewhat arbitrary; 
but, for many IR and IE studies, a level of 5% is the conventional choice. A 
more formal approach would involved a measuring the signal to noise ratio 
and considering sample size to determine the most precise level of confi-
dence. 
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Effects Of OCR Errors On Probabilistic IR 
Another document collection from the Department of Energy containing this 
time 674 documents was given to the researchers. These documents were 
recognized by three different OCR devices that varied in their level of char-
acter accuracy: the highest accuracy (98.14%), an intermediate accuracy 
(97.06%), and a lowest level of accuracy (94.63%). These three document 
collections were separately loaded into a probabilistic information retrieval 
system. This system, called INQUERY, was developed at the University of 
Massachusetts (Callan, Croft, and Harding, 1992).  
The probabilistic approach uses inference networks to model query 
and document content based on concepts. Roughly, concepts correspond to 
terms. Concept associations are based on document-term frequency and 
collection-term frequency. The formula below is used to assign concept  to 
document : 
 
where  
            ≡ collection size 
           ≡ number of documents in which concept  occurs  
           ≡ frequency of concept  in document  
     ≡ maximum concept frequency in document  
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The parameter  serves to bias the initial belief of term relevance and can 
be adjusted by the user to fit the collection. For this study, the default was 
 = 0.4 was used.  
Each query produced a ranked list of documents for both the correct 
data and the OCR data. We compute the precision at 10 standard recall lev-
els points. For example, to compute the precision at recall level 10%, we see 
how far down the ranked results set we need to go to achieve 10% recall.  
Suppose there a total of 100 relevant documents, and the top 20 documents 
contain 10 relevant documents. That means the top 20 documents have a 
10% recall and a 50% precision because only half of the documents are 
relevant. The table below shows the precision and recalls results for the four 
document collections. 
 
 Table 4.1 Precision at standard recall points 
Recall 
Correct 
Data 
OCR 
Best 
OCR 
Middle 
OCR 
Worst 
10 53.5 53.1 52.9 54.0 
20 46.0 44.8 45.7 47.6 
30 38.6 38.9 40.8 39.7 
40 33.8 33.8 35.3 35.6 
50 30.4 30.5 31.0 31.9 
60 23.3 24.6 24.6 24.7 
70 17.8 17.3 17.5 18.5 
80 14.7 13.5 13.2 14.1 
90 12.7 11.1 10.8 11.6 
100 11.8 10.5 10.2 10.6 
Average 28.3 27.8 28.2 28.8 
% Change  -1.6 -0.2 2.0 	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Figure 4.2 Precision-Recall curve at 10 standard recall points 
 
All four curves are nearly identical, and the differences so small so as 
to consider them insignificant from an information retrieval perspective. If 
the percent change between the correct data and any of the OCR collections 
for the average precision, was greater than 5%, then we would considered 
the difference to be significant. 
Effects Of OCR Errors On Vector Space Model IR 
Another document collection from the Department of Energy containing this 
time 674 documents was given to the researchers. Two version of this single 
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collection were generated: one an OCR generated collection with 80-90% 
level of character accuracy, and another that was a manually corrected ver-
sion of these same documents. Roughly, the same set of queries as were 
used in the study of the Probabilistic IR system were used for this study.  
In Vector Space Model, every document (or query) is represented by a 
corresponding vector:  
  
€ 
D = d1,,dt( )  where each weight  is non-zero if the term appears in 
the document (or query). An inner product can provide a scalar value repre-
senting the similarity between two documents. The SMART IR systems uses 
a three part weighting scheme, with each weight having a document and a 
query component (Salton & Buckley, 1988):  
1. Term Frequency Component: considers term frequency with respect 
to a single document,  
2. Collection Frequency Component: considers term frequency with 
respect to the entire collection.  
3. Vector Normalization Component: treats long and short documents 
with some equality.  
The overall dot product is  
 
Before explaining the different options for each of the three weights, some 
definitions are needed. 
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•  term frequency, total number of occurrence of a term in a given 
document 
• collection frequency, total number of occurrences of term in the 
collection 
• document frequency, total number of documents with a given term 
 
Below are three table with each of the options for the three compo-
nents of the weighting scheme. Within the SMART system, the user is free to 
choose any of these combinations, but some have proven to be superior for 
collections with particular idiosyncrasies (Salton & Buckley, 1998).  
There are a total of  possible weighting combinations. 
A carefully selected ten of those combinations were chosen for this study. 
Unfortunately, the history of the selection criteria is not readily available. 
The SMART system has a concise notation for labeling the particular weight-
ing scheme: xxx.xxx. The three characters to the left of the period represent 
the weighting combination used for the document, and the three to the 
right, for the query. For example, atc.atn applies augmented normalization 
term frequency (the first a), inverse document frequency (the first t), and co-
sine normalization (the second a) to the document vector, and augmented 
normalization term frequency (the second a), inverse document frequency 
(second t), and no normalization (the n) to the query vector. 
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Table 4.2 Options for  weights 
Abbreviation Description Formula 
N none 1 
A augmented normalized  
L natural logarithm  
S square  
 
 
Table 4.3 Options for  weights 
Abbreviation Description Formula 
N none 1 
T inverse doc frequency  
P probabilistic  
S square  
 
 
Table 4.4 Options for  weights 
Abbreviation Description Formula 
N none 1 
T sum  
C cosine  
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Table 4.5 Average Precision for Correct and OCR Collections 
Weighting Correct Data OCR Data % Difference 
nnn.atn 0.2457 0.2497 1.63 
ann.atn 0.3222 0.3308 2.67 
lnn.atn 0.3311 0.3421 3.32 
snn.atn 0.2053 0.2006 -2.29 
ntn.atn 0.2898 0.2881 -0.59 
npn.atn 0.3110 0.3153 1.38 
nsn.atn 0.3305 0.3269 -1.09 
nns.atn 0.2913 0.2873 -1.37 
nnc.atn 0.3500 0.3381 -3.40 
atc.atn 0.2228 0.2235 0.31 
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Figure 4.3 Average Precision for Correct (c) and OCR (o) Collections 
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Figure 4.4 % Change in Average Precision for Correct-OCR 
 
The order of the different schemes has no special meaning. If any of 
the bars had been above or below the 5% marks, then we would have con-
sidered the differences significant. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS FOR INFORMATION EXTRACTION  
 
USING HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS 
 
Introduction 
In this section we describe the development and effectiveness of a Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) based extraction program to identify potentially pri-
vate addresses. We found that HMMs provide high recall and precision for 
this task. However, we also discovered that optical character recognition 
(OCR) errors degraded the performance of the program. This last result is 
somewhat surprising given that document retrieval has been shown, on av-
erage, not to be so affected (Taghva, Coombs, Pereda, & Nartker, 2005). We 
also discovered that for our task, the smoothing technique called shrinkage 
did not improve our results. 
We will first describe the problem our HMM is designed to solve in the 
next section. We discuss previous attempts to extract information such as 
addresses using HMMs. Presented thereafter is a standard definition of 
HMMs and the details of our implementation of the address-finding HMM.  
We describe how the HMM was trained. We next discuss some problems re-
sulting from errors in the OCR processing of training documents. Finally, we 
describe the construction and outcomes of experiments measuring the effec-
tiveness of several variations on our address-finding HMM for various types 
of documents.  
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Applications for Address Extraction 
United States Department of Justice (1974) established a code of fair infor-
mation practices that governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dis-
semination of personally identifiable information about individuals. Accord-
ing to the Privacy Act of 1974, the United States Government cannot make 
public private information about American citizens. However, to comply with 
the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Government must make many 
of its documents and records available to the public. These documents, 
therefore, must be reviewed to determine if they contain private information. 
Since the number of documents to be reviewed is very large, and human re-
view is costly and time-consuming, it is clearly advantageous to seek auto-
matic methods for identifying likely private information in documents. 
For certain types of private information, such as social security num-
bers, a simple regular expression matching technique proved effective for 
the majority of cases. However, the prospects of such a solution for identify-
ing addresses seemed unlikely as we reviewed the data and noted the wide 
variation in address formats. In addition, many documents had been OCRed 
and some noise had been introduced into the target addresses. Since Hid-
den Markov Models have been applied to problems similar to ours with 
some success, we decided to explore the use of an HMM to identify personal 
addresses (Bikel, Miller, & Weischedel, 1997; Leek, 1997). 
Our task is to identify a set of documents such that the likelihood of 
them containing private information is extremely low. In other words we 
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want to locate the “easy” examples of non-private documents so that they 
can be released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. 
Documents that we place in the “private” category will very likely still 
contain documents without private information. However, these more diffi-
cult cases will be subject to a manual review by human experts. Our auto-
matic process aims to reduce the number of documents requiring human 
review but does no eliminate the need for such a review completely. 
Thus, as we will see, the worst mistake for us is a false negative: a 
document containing private information in which our HMM finds none. We 
can accept, within reason, a higher rate of false positives if doing so de-
creases false negatives. We can accept loses in precision to boost recall. 
Hidden Markov Models 
A Hidden Markov Model is a finite state automaton with probabilistic transi-
tions and symbol emissions. An HMM consists of 
• A set of states,  
• An emission vocabulary,  
• Each state is associated with a probability distribution over emission 
symbols where the probability that a state s emits symbol  is given 
by . 
• Each state is further associated with a probability distribution over 
the set of possible outgoing transitions. The probability of moving 
from state  to  is given by . 
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• Finally, a subset of the states are considered start states, and to each 
of these is associated an “initial” probability that the state will be a 
start state. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Hidden Markov Model for Addresses 
 
Following the model of Freitag and McCallum (1999), our HMM has 
four types of states. Background states represent symbols that are not part 
of an address nor part of the “context” of one. We defined the “context” to 
include the four terms in the document prior and the four terms subsequent 
to the address. The prior four terms correspond to what we call the four pre-
fix states of an address, and the following four terms in the context are four 
suffix states. Target states represent the parts of the address. Figure 1 pro-
vides an illustration of the structure of our HMM. More specifically, figure 1 
illustrates the structure of our “clean” HMM as discussed more in chapter 8. 
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Figure 5.2 HMM Hidden Symbols used for Address Extraction 
 
Figure 5.2 displays how we defined the emission vocabulary for the 
HMM. As in Bikel (1997), vocabulary identification had an ordering which is 
reflected in the list in our figure. This means that a term is first scanned to 
determine if is ends in a comma. If so, the comma is removed and the com-
ma itself is represented in the HMM with the distinct symbol comma. Next, 
the remainder of the term is checked to determine if it is a five or nine digit 
number with an optional hyphen after the fifth digit. In such a case the term 
is represented in the HMM with the symbol ziplike.  The symbol colon is 
only added if a term ends in a colon prior to the removal of a final comma. If 
it is not such a number, then it is checked if it is phonelike, and so on. 
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Terms were placed in this taxonomy in two ways. Either a straightfor-
ward regular expression match was used, as in the case of ziplike and 
phonelike, or a term was matched against a database of known objects. For 
example, a very short list of city names most relevant to the documents was 
generated. This list took into consideration that most of the documents con-
cerned government employees and contractors from government offices and 
businesses dealing with nuclear power. 
After a document is converted to symbols by this taxonimizing proc-
ess, addresses are discovered by applying the well-known Viterbi algorithm 
to the resulting string of symbols. As explained in Rabiner (1993), the 
Viterbi algorithm uses dynamic programming techniques to determine the 
most likely state sequence for the document. Of interest to us are those 
subsequences consisting of target states since they represent the most likely 
addresses. 
Training Hidden Markov Models 
Training for the HMM was based on tagged documents which were marked 
by human experts with the Information Science Research Institute’s (ISRI) 
META-Marker tool (Taghva, 2004). The topology of transitions as illustrated 
in figure 5.1 was predetermined except for the lengths of the target se-
quences, which were determined by the marked data. Figure 5.1 is some-
what simplified for aesthetic purposes. Transitions from suffix states to any 
of the prefix states was allowed, and a final target state could transition to a 
prefix state if addresses appeared close together in training data. 
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Transition probabilities were estimated by Maximum Likelihood:  
 
Initial probabilities representing the beginning of the document were set by 
hand. The initial probability was divided uniformly over the background 
state, all prefix states, and the first target state. 
The emission probability table is estimated with Maximum Likelihood 
supplemented by smoothing. Smoothing is required because Maximum 
Likelihood estimation will sometimes assign a zero probability to unseen 
emission-state combinations. 
Prior to smoothing, emission probabilities are estimated by:  
€ 
P(w | s)ml =
number of times symbol w is emitted at state s
total number of symbols emitted by state s  
We used absolute discounting to smooth emission probabilities. Abso-
lute discounting consists of subtracting a small amount of probability  
from all symbols assigned a non-zero probability at a state . Probability  is 
then distributed equally over symbols given zero probability by the Maxi-
mum Likelihood estimate. 
If v is the number of symbols assigned non-zero probability at a state  
and  is the total number of symbols, emission probabilities are calculated 
by 
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Freitag (1999) reports that there is no known solution for determining 
the optimal value for . We followed Borkar (2001) in using 
 
where  is the total number of symbols emitted by state , i.e., the denomi-
nator of . 
In addition to absolute discounting, Freitag and McCallum (1999) 
propose applying a more elaborate smoothing technique called shrinkage. 
According to this approach, various alternative distributions are defined for 
the emission probability  for each state . The default distribution is 
absolute discounting. Further, each probability can “shrink” to its parent 
distribution. For example, the target parent is estimated by dividing the 
number of times a symbol is emitted by any target state by the total number 
of symbols emitted by any target state. The non-target ancestor shrinks to 
the common ancestor state of all background, prefix, and suffix states. The 
context grandparent shrinks prefix and suffix states to a state common to all 
prefixes and suffixes. Finally each distribution can shrink to the uniform 
distribution. 
Table 5.1 Types of Shrinkages Possible For Each State 
state type default parent context 
grandparent 
non-target 
ancestor 
uniform 
back-
ground 
     
target      
suffix      
prefix      
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For each symbol-state combination, the final emission probability 
 is determined by a weighted sum of the estimates from the table 
above. For example, a given suffix state will have a default probability, a suf-
fix parent, a context grandparent, a non-target ancestor, and the uniform 
distribution probabilities associated with it, and each of these will be as-
signed a weight . We thus define 
 
In the case of a suffix state, for example, 
 would represent its default, suffix 
parent, context grandparent, non-target ancestor, and uniform probabilities. 
The value  is the number of alternative probabilities for a given type of 
state. For a suffix state, . 
Optimal values for the λ weights are discovered using Expectation 
Maximization. Following Freitag (1999), we initialize the  λ’s to 
€ 
1
k . Holding 
out each symbol in turn in a hold-out set 
€ 
H j , we perform the following two 
steps until the values of all  λ’s no longer change:  
E-step: Determine how much each emission state predicts the sym-
bols from a held-out set  for each state s: 
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M-step: Derive new ’s by normalizing the ’s: 
 
Finally, the output of our HMM consists of sequences of strings which 
are likely addresses. In fact, the HMM will sometimes discover non-
addresses, and the HMM has no concept of a “private” address. For these 
reasons, filters had to be introduced to remove obvious non-addresses and 
known “public” addresses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EFFECTS OF OCR ERRORS ON INFORMATION EXTRACTION USING  
 
HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS 
 
OCR Related Difficulties 
Several difficulties occurred in OCR documents which affected the training 
for the HMM. Roughly, they can be divided three categories: text ordering 
not matching human visual ordering, information loss during OCR, and 
handwritten addresses.  
 
Figure 6.1 Tagging of HQZ.19880629.6150 
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OCR RELATED DIFFICULTIES 
Several difficulties occurred in OCR documents which affected the training 
for the HMM. Three major difficulties are detailed below. 
 While the META-marker tool allowed experts to mark zones on the 
document image which were derived from OCR information, the ordering of 
the text in the OCR output did not always correspond to the ordering in-
ferred by the human expert viewing the image. Figure 6.2 shows a redacted 
private address in the context of handwritten text. Figure 6.1 reveals how 
the OCRed text was tagged. (The figures are in presented out of order due to 
formatting requirements of this document. Conceptually, the processing 
proceeds from image, to OCR, and to tagging, which corresponds to figures 
6.2, 6.3, and 6.1.) Prefix-tagged terms were separated from target-tagged 
terms by background-tagged terms and the suffix-tagged terms were taken 
out of order. In fact, the term tagged as “suffix3” was placed in the midst of 
background-tagged terms, and a single address was tagged as two distinct 
addresses. Obviously, there is only a tenuous correspondence between the 
tagged address and the “ideal” topology of figure 5.1. “X” is used in figure 
6.1 to redact private information. 
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Figure 6.2 Address in HQZ.19890203.1143 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Resulting OCR of HQZ.19890203.1143 
 
In some documents, addresses viewable in the document images were 
either partially or completely lost in the OCR process. Also, useful context 
information would occasionally be lost as well. Figure 6.3 and its corre-
sponding OCR in figure 6.1 provide an example of lost information. 
In some documents handwritten addresses appeared which were not 
recognized by the OCR. This can be seen in figure 6.4. Several documents 
were simply removed from our training and testing sets because these prob-
lems recognizing handwriting appear to us to require a different approach 
entirely. 
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Figure 6.4 Address in HQZ.19880629.6150 
 
HMM Experiments 
The first two problems noted in the previous section brings up the 
question whether the tagging should be “cleaned up” to reflect our precon-
ceived ideas about how the HMM should be structured, or whether it should 
be left “as is” to reflect the reality of the data. 
We decided to compare the performance of an HMM trained on tagged 
documents which contained “incorrect” tags with an HMM trained only on 
documents where the tags fit our assumed topology illustrated in figure 5.1. 
Human experts identified 251 documents and emails in a large collec-
tion of documents from various government agencies which contain ad-
dresses subject to the privacy act. Addresses in 187 of these documents 
were tagged with the META-marker tool. Documents with handwritten ad-
dresses were removed from the 187 and 89 were randomly selected for 
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training what we call the default HMM. Some of these 89 documents contain 
“incorrect” tagging due to the OCR difficulties described in the previous sec-
tion. 
A second training set was derived from the first by removing all exam-
ples which contained “incorrect” tagging. The HMM based on this training 
set was called clean. 
A test set of 614 documents and emails was constructed from (1) a 
random sample from the 251 documents containing private addresses, with 
hand-written examples removed, (2) a random sample of emails from a large 
(more than 20,000) collection of government emails, and (3) a random sam-
ple from 2,000 government documents. 
Three experiments were performed. In the first, the default HMM was 
run on the test set. In the second, the clean HMM was run against the same 
data. Finally, the emission table for the clean HMM was optimized using 
shrinkage. 
The standard performance measures of precision, recall, and F1 were 
calculated for each experiment. Let TP be the number of true positives, that 
is, the number of documents which both experts and the HMM agreed con-
tain private addresses. Let FN be the number of false negatives, i.e., the 
number of documents which experts said contain privacy, but the HMM 
marked as not having privacy. We then define recall as 
 
	  36	  
Letting FP signify the number of false positives, i.e., those documents which 
the HMM marked as containing privacy but which experts decided does not, 
precision is defined as 
 
The harmonic mean of precision and recall is called the F1 measure, defined 
as:  
 
The results of our experiments are presented below. 
 
Table 6.1 Precision, Recall, and F1 Score Results 
EXPERIMENT TP FP FN TN PRECISION RECALL F1 
DEFAULT 104 4 9 495 0.963 0.920 0.941 
CLEAN 108 16 5 483 0.871 0.956 0.911 
SHRINKAGE 108 28 5 471 0.794 0.956 0.867 	  	  
The value TN represents the number of true negatives, which are 
documents which both the experts and the HMM agreed did not contain pri-
vate addresses.	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CHAPTER 7 
METHODS FOR INFORMATION EXTRACTION USING 
 
 PRECISE SHALLOW PARSING 
 
Introduction 
Federal, state, and local governments maintain records containing very spe-
cific personal information about individuals. Hospitals also have records of 
this sort of information. Personally Identifiable Information (PII), as it is 
called, refers to any information that identifies or can be used to identify, 
contact, or locate the person to whom such information pertains.  This in-
cludes information that is used in a way that is personally identifiable, in-
cluding linking it with identifiable information from other sources, or from 
which other personally identifiable information can easily be derived, in-
cluding, but not limited to, name, address, phone number, fax number, 
email address, financial profiles, patients' records, social security number, 
and credit card information.   
Among many projects dealing with patients’ records, the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH) is interested in applications of data mining to the 
vast amount of text. This text must not include any identifiers, for example 
name, postcode, date of birth, or National Health Service (NHS) number. 
Typically the identifiers must be coded so that the information cannot di-
rectly identify an individual, but a 'key' is available to re-link data with iden-
tifying information. Identification of PII is necessary to avoid accidental re-
lease of un-coded data. Knowing that the number of records that contain PII 
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is substantial and human review is costly. It is clearly advantageous to seek 
automatic methods for identifying PII.  
In this chapter, we describe the development and effectiveness of a 
pattern-based extraction program to identify potentially private date of birth 
information. We found that pattern-based extraction provides high recall 
and precision for this task. However, we also discovered that optical charac-
ter recognition (OCR) errors degraded the performance of the program. We 
also discovered some techniques for making our extraction program resis-
tant to OCR errors. 
In the following sections, we will first describe the problem our infor-
mation extraction program is designed to solve and then we describe the de-
tailed design of our solution. 
Extracting Date Of Birth Information 
The Department of Energy (DOE) is publishing many once private docu-
ments concerning the development of the Yucca Mountain Project. For most 
documents, nobody knew if they contained private information. The DOE is 
required to publish this information in order to comply with the Freedom of 
Information Act. However, these documents must be "scrubbed", or re-
dacted, of personal information before publishing. This is in accordance 
with the Privacy Act of 1974, which states that the United States Govern-
ment cannot make public private information about American citizens. 
Since the number of pages to be reviewed is in the millions, human review is 
costly and time consuming. We are developing automatic methods to iden-
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tify the documents that do not contain privacy information with very high 
probability. These non-private documents will be published without further 
human review. The remaining "potentially private" documents would be sent 
on for human review. For the document collection from the DOE, the 
amount of human review would be reduced by a factor of ten roughly, esti-
mated from the ratio of private to non-private documents and the precision 
of our extraction system. There will likely be many potentially private docu-
ments that will turn out not to be private after careful human review. 
Our method of evaluation for finding date of birth will mirror the 
standard method in most information extraction experiments. The abbrevia-
tion DOB stands for “date of birth”. We use: 
 
  
and 
  
 
We also look at the results on a more coarse grain by computing recall and 
precision on a per document basis as shown in the equations below: 
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and 
  
 
When it is deemed that further human review is necessary, the re-
viewer will examine the entire document not just simple windows of text 
with potential DOB information. Precision and recall on a per document ba-
sis more closely models the effectiveness of our human-and-machine review 
process. 
Finding Extraction Patterns 
The first problem we tackled was that of extracting all the dates which come 
in many different formats. A crude UNIX grep(1) of lines with digits was per-
formed to reduce the amount of text under review for finding all formats. It 
quickly became evident that many of the dates in the documents were much 
more recent than the birth dates, such as the dating of a letter. By filtering 
the dates by years before 1990, we reduced the number or dates to consider 
by three orders of magnitude and removed no known birth dates from the 
training data. Next, the text to the left and right of each date was trimmed 
and each occurrence of a digit was replaced by the single letter d. What re-
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mained were roughly the nine patterns for all the observed date formats. Be-
low is an example of each pattern: 
• 1968-3-15 
• January 15, 1968 
• 3/15/1968 
• 3-15-1968 
• 4th of July, 1968 
• 15 September, 1968 
• 09-18-21 
• 09/18/21 
• l5-JUN-53 
 
While testing data was being prepared with ground truth information, we 
decided to mine the web using Google for extraction patterns. We searched 
for "George Washington" and pulled out snippets that contained his birth-
day as well as his name. 
Below is a sample list: 
• George Washington (born February 22,1732), 
• George Washington Tuesday, February 22; 
• George Washington's Birthday is February 22. 
• GEORGE WASHINGTON, b. February 22, 
• George Washington was actually born February 22, 1732 
• I learned about George Washington. He was born February 22, 1732. 
• George Washington ~Date of Birth~ February 22, 1732 
• George Washington, the first president of the United States, was born on 
February 22, 1732. 
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Each occurrence of George Washington was replaced by aName and each 
occurrence of a date was replaced by aDate.  The resulting lines were sorted 
by frequency of occurrences. Below is a sample of the top extraction pat-
terns: 
• aName was born on aDate 
• aName's Birthday aDate 
• aName ( aDate ) 
• aName, born on aDate 
• aName, (aDate-aDate2) 
• aName, born aDate 
• aName: aDate 
• aName's aDate birthday 
• aName was born aDate 
• On aDate, aName was born. 
• aName's Birthday (on aDate) 
 
We then proceeded to implement the following algorithm to make use of 
the extraction patterns. First, we extracted a window of text centered about 
each date. Dates after 1990 were discarded as not possible birth dates of 
employees. The size of the window was estimated to be 20 words to the left 
and right. Using the Microsoft Live search engine, we tracked the number of 
hits for each phrase with no more than 40 words between George Washing-
ton and his birth date. This search engine's proximity feature does allow the 
terms name and birth date to occur in either order. The chart below shows 
that the number of hits levels off after about 20 words. 
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Note that the data is slightly noisy. If it were completely accurate, the num-
ber of hits should be strictly non-decreasing, and it is not. Approximate 
searching can be kludged together using Google's asterisk feature inside of 
quoted strings. For example, “George Washington * * * * February 22, 1832” 
should return the documents where the two terms are exactly separated by 
four words. Unfortunately, this feature used to work but now returns no re-
sults. 
Figure 7.1  Hits versus Span between name and birth date 
 
Spans of about 20 words are the maximum between name and birth 
date that refer to each other. If you search for windows longer than 20 
words, you'll find that your search crosses sentence boundaries. We later 
simplified the window size calculations to be 300 characters to the left and 
right of the date. For each window, we attempted to match an extraction 
pattern. If we found a match, we stopped trying other extraction patterns 
and reported a found birth date. We found that many of the missed extrac-
tion patterns were based on failed matches of personal names. Correctly 
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matching personal names proved to be just as difficult a task as finding 
birth dates if not more so. 
At this point we decided to relax the matching of personal names re-
quirement. After all, for redaction purposes only the date needs to be blotted 
out, and not the name. We then also relaxed the extraction patterns to sim-
ply be that the window contains at least one of the following keywords: 
'D.O.B.', 'DOB', a word starting with 'birth', or the word 'born'. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EFFECTS OF OCR ERRORS ON INFORMATION EXTRACTION USING  
 
PRECISE SHALLOW PARSING 
 
Blind Testing of DOB Extractor Program 
The extractor program was developed in two successive versions. For the 
first version, we built an extractor using web documents for well known 
people and their birth dates. Still these documents do not provide examples 
of all the possible text patterns for expressing DOB that we will see in the 
Yucca Mountain data. The focus here was making sure we did not miss any 
birth dates, in other words no false positives. For the second version, we 
added to the extractor program after studying a sample of 3l documents and 
emails containing Privacy Act relevant date of birth information. The focus 
here was relaxing the constraints of the extraction patterns without intro-
ducing any false positives. Human experts, different from the developers of 
the program, made the relevancy judgments. All the data was actual busi-
ness data from the Yucca Mountain Project delivered to the Information Sci-
ence Research Institute. A much larger and unseen data set consisting of 
1075 documents was used for the blind testing. 
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Precision and Recall Results 
 
Table 8.1 Precision and Recall Results on 1075 Clean Text Documents 
Per-Document Per-Hit 
tp: 67 fp: 3  tp: 215 fp: 32 
fn: 9 tn: 997 fn: 91 tn: 997 
precision: 95.71% recall: 88.16% precision: 87.04% recall: 70.26% 
  
 
Table 8.2 Precision and Recall Results on 1075 OCRed Documents 
Per-Document Per-Hit 
tp: 64 fp: 3 tp: 180 fp: 1173 
fn: 12 tn: 997 fn: 128 tn: 997 
precision: 95.52% recall: 84.12% precision: 13.30% recall: 58.44% 
  
 
The per-hit precision dropped in OCRed documents due to the misrecogni-
tion of a table of dates for a table of birth dates. Tables of dates are typically 
recognized as "all or none", meaning the extraction works the same for each 
date. Tables are somewhat of an oddity that should probably be tackled as 
its own separate problem. Fortunately, they make up only 12% of dates in 
the documents, so we can still get useful results without much custom tai-
loring to tables. 
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Making the Patterns Robust to OCR Errors 
About one-third of the extraction errors on the OCR collection were due to 
misrecognized words such as "date of birth" being OCRed into "duty of 
birth", and “BIRTH” being OCRed into “9RTH”. If we consider the top 100 of 
all OCR-confusions, and apply just the top one or two confusions to each 
keyword, we typically only generate one or two additional keywords. This 
makes sense given that our keywords are rather short, at most eight charac-
ters. If we add these OCR-generated words to the keywords list, the extrac-
tion process would survive the OCR errors that occur inside of keywords. 
Another third of the extraction errors occurred when a date was not 
recognized at all because it has at least one OCR error. Applying the same 
recovery technique as above would not work because of the very large num-
ber of strings that can represent slightly OCR-corrupted dates. We identified 
the dates using a very large (500 characters long) regular expression that 
allowed for dozens of different formats. We can relax the conditions on this 
regular expression using what is known as approximate (fuzzy) regexp. 
Fuzzy regexp was first implement by Wu and Manber (1992) in the agrep 
program. Laurikari (2009) has released a free implementation called TRE 
which allows for regular expressions of any length and more detailed speci-
fication of the fuzziness. The fuzziness is specified using edit-distance 
measure (also known as the Levenshtein distance) where characters can be 
inserted, deleted, or substituted in the searched text in order to get an exact 
match on the regular expression. For example, the “bom” can be trans-
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formed into “born” using one delete of the m, and two insertions, one for r 
and another for n. Assuming equal weighting, we can specify an edit dis-
tance of three in order allow for this one OCR error during matches. 
The last thirds of the OCR errors were due to zoning distortions. This 
is partially due to tables. Consider a department’s employee list in two col-
umn format with field labels like name and date of birth. On the left we have 
actual names and on the right specific dates. If the OCR engine zones the 
list into separate columns, the window of text near "date of birth" would now 
become many characters away, and perhaps outside of the 300 character 
limit. If we increase the window size to that of a typical whole page, we 
would avoid the zoning distortions. However, we do increase the likelihood 
of finding other non-birthdate dates in the window. To what extent we've in-
crease false negatives, would have to have to be measured. In all likelihood, 
that would cause almost any document with a table of dates and names to 
be labeled as containing date of birth information. Zoning problems have 
been previously identified as significantly degrading information extraction 
of privacy data in general, not just date of birth information (Taghva, 
Beckley, & Coombs, 2006). 
Another approach to handling degraded OCR searching is described 
by Harding, Croft, and Weir (1997). This is a specialized form of query ex-
pansion based on using 2-grams, 3-grams, and 5-grams. Using only partial 
words inside of extraction rules represented by the n-grams would poten-
tially increase our false positives. So for example, we could make “bor” one 
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of the keywords needed near a date to trigger an extraction. Similar to what 
Harding did, we can corrupt whole keywords using character recognition 
confusions typical of OCR systems, including the inclusion and deletion of 
spaces in words or phrases. Using n-grams would be ideal in the most se-
verely corrupted text where there might be more than one corruption within 
a window. However, this technique would not work for extracting non-
specific dates in a very large number of formats. The amount of actual 
strings represented by corrupted possible dates is very large. Estimating 50 
different formats, 365 different values, 20 different OCR variants gives 
nearly a half millions strings. Searching for this many strings in parallel re-
quires a very different implementation that those focused on a few patterns 
with a few errors. This approach is still very feasible. In another unrelated 
project, we have implemented and performance tested an Aho-Corasick 
(1974) automaton in Java on a million strings, each about 20 characters in 
length, and found the pattern matching to be O/I bound. 
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CHAPTER 9 
METHODS FOR INFORMATION EXTRACTION USING 
 
 FUZZY SHALLOW PARSING 
 
Introduction 
Federal agencies, state governments, and local agencies are regularly mak-
ing records available to the public via the Internet or other media. All these 
records must be scanned for Personally Identifiable Information (PII) prior to 
public release. The Licensing Support Network is a document repository 
built by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2010) for public review. The LSN is 
a large document repository of over forty million pages that will provide in-
formation to the proceedings for licensing Yucca Mountain’s nuclear waste 
repository. A typical example of PII is the occurrences of individuals and 
their dates of birth. Other examples are individuals’ addresses, phone num-
bers, fax numbers, email addresses, and credit card information. 
Manual review for PII of large collections is not only expensive but al-
so impractical. Knowing that the number of documents to be reviewed for 
PII is substantial and human review is costly, it is clearly advantageous to 
seek automatic methods for identifying PII in documents. Since most re-
cords are retained in paper form, an automatic solution begins with conver-
sion to an electronic format using OCR. Subsequently, the process would 
then apply various IE and/or categorization techniques to identify records 
with PII. Finally, these documents must then be redacted prior to public re-
lease.  
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In this chapter, we describe the development and effectiveness of a 
fuzzy pattern-based extraction program for identification of  Date of Birth PII 
(Pereda & Taghva, 2011). We found that fuzzy extraction provides high recall 
for this task. However, we also discovered that fuzzy matching produces a 
high recall at the expense of a low precision. 
We will first describe the problem our information extraction (IE) pro-
gram is designed to solve in this chapter. We then describe the detailed de-
sign of our solution. The next chapter explains the collecting process of the 
clean and OCRed text. This is followed up the blind testing along with the 
actual precision and recall numbers. 
Extraction Date of Birth Information 
Many of the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) patterns are of the form 
E1 R E2, where E1 and E2 are entities and R is the relationship between 
these entities. In the Date of Birth example, the relationship R establishes 
that the entity E2 is the date of birth for the entity E1. The study of patterns 
of this sort can lead to a partial solution to the PII problem. There are many 
known techniques for extracting pattern of this form. The most popular 
methods are a combination of Hidden Markov Model  (HMM), language pat-
tern processing, and ad-hoc algorithms (Taghva, Coombs, Pereda, & Nart-
ker, 2005; Brin, 1998; Harding, 1997). Most of the extraction techniques 
rely on tokens such as “born” or “birth” to establish the relationship. These 
tokens could have been corrupted during the conversion process using 
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OCR. Consequently, one has to modify the process to overcome some of the 
difficulties associated with the OCR errors.  
 
Our method of evaluation for finding date of birth will mirror the 
standard method in most information extraction experiments. The abbrevia-
tion DOB stands for “date of birth”. We use: 	  
  	  
and  
  	  
Hits were measured on a line-by-line basis. We choose our document 
collection so it would contain a high concentration of DOB. In practice, 
when filtering DOB information it will be much more sparse. There will be 
fewer DOB hits per line and per document. All but two of the fifty, or 96%, 
test documents contained DOB information. The density of DOB information 
for LSN documents will typically be less than 10% of the documents (Tagh-
va, Coombs, Pereda, and Nartker 2005). 
Fuzzy Matching and High Recall 
The objective of this experiment was to achieve a high recall of over 95% 
with a reasonable precision of around 30%. We constructed two fuzzy pat-
terns using agrep (Wu & Manber, 1992; Laurikari, 2009) to identify dates 
and birth indicators. Agrep stands for approximate regular expression pars-
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parser. The first pattern is a dash with a number on the left and right, each 
within 40 characters of the dash. The intention is to capture patterns of the 
following forms, where the first three are from the clean documents and the 
second three are from the OCR documents:   1. 1870	  -­‐1924	  2. (c.	  581	  -­‐	  November,	  644)	  	  3. (ca.	  570/571	  Mecca[َة￿َك￿َم￿	  ]/[	   ْه￿َك￿َم￿	  ]	  –	  June	  8,	  632)	  4. t3lt4ltsl	  @a.	  5701571	  Mecca[eS.	  llli&']	  -­‐	  June	  8,632	  5. Lnuis	  Pasteur	  (l	  822-­‐	  I	  895)	  6. (t9zg	  -­‐	  1953)	  	  
The second pattern is a number with the token “birth” or “born” with 100 
characters of the number. The tokens “birth” or “born” can be as much as 
an edit distance of 2 away from “birth” or “born”. So “bom” is an edit dis-
tance of 2 away from born. The intension is to capture patterns of the form: 
1. born: Jan 01, 1751 
2. he was born -on Feb. 11, 1947 
3. Born: August l6, 1769 
4. Mendel was bom in Hyncice, Moravia on22 Julyll22in what 
5. tsirth: c1400 in Mainz, Germany 
6. b, 18 November 1787; d. 10 JulY 1851 	  	  
Here are the two patterns: 
Pattern 1, clean and OCR documents:             
[0-9]+.{0,40}[-].{0,40}[0-9]+ 
Date ranges surrounded with parenthesis are a subset of the date ranges 
without parenthesis. For this reason, we dropped the parenthesis from this 
pattern to cover both cases. Both cases occur about equally often for birth 
dates. The precision is higher when the parentheses are present. Because 
	  54	  
our main priority for this study is high recall, this is an acceptable simplify-
ing assumption. 
Pattern 1 is used on both the clean and OCR documents. For pattern 
2 a, the date and keyword can occur in either order. For pattern 2 b, the 
date must immediately follow the “b.”. 
 
For pattern 2, clean documents: 
Pattern 2 a:       [0-9]+ AND  \b(birth|born)\b 
Pattern 2 b:       \b[.] [0-9]+ 
 
For pattern 2, OCR documents: 
Pattern 2 a:       [0-9]+ AND  \b(birth|born){-1+2#2~2}\b 
Pattern 2 b:       \b[.,] [0-9]+’ 
 
The patterns are specified using POSIX compliant regular expressions. A 
string of digits is specified as [0-9]+. A comma or period are specified in ‘[.,]’. 
These two characters were found to OCR confused for one another in the 
training data. The ‘\b’ denotes a word boundary. All matching was set to be 
case-insensitive. 
Appending approx-settings to the subpattern sets the approximate 
matching settings for a subpattern. Limits for the number of errors are 
specified. The count-limits were used to set limits for the number of inser-
tions (+), deletions (-), substitutions (#), and total number of errors (~). For 
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the approx-setting {-1+2#2~2}, the matching allows at most one deletion, at 
most two insertions, and at most two substitutions. The total number of er-
rors allowed is two. When speaking more broadly, an edit distance of 2 is a 
rough approximation of the settings used here. 
Consider the misrecognized ‘bom’ for ‘born’. Deleting the ‘r’ and re-
placing the ‘n’ with ‘m’ can transform one word into the other. Because 
there were two edit operations to repair the error, the edit distance is 2, 
which is within the limit of 2 for this approx-setting. So ‘(born){-1+2#2~2}’ 
will match ‘bom’. Born is a very short keyword so we can’t allow more errors 
without exponentially increasing the number of possible matches, many of 
which would lead to false positives. These setting were arrived at with ex-
perimentation with matching of word list generated from training data. Us-
ing the same approx-setting, ‘Birth’ will also match ‘tsirth’ because one word 
can be transformed into the other with one deletion and one substitution. 
This was an actual error that was not seen in the training data, but was in 
the blind testing data. 
In some traditional information exaction, dates are matched using a 
very complex pattern tuned to large collection of clean data. This was the 
approached used in (Pereda & Taghva, 2010). Producing and tuning this ex-
traction pattern is very specific to the data set and takes much time to fine 
tune. Someone doing information extraction on OCRed dates would quickly 
give up using this kind of patterns because dates can have such a wide va-
riety of OCR errors compared to a fixed string of characters for clean dates. 
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For this study, the assumption that a date always contains at least one 
number provides a practical matching heuristic. It is conceivable that the 
numbers were spelled out but that never occurred once in the training data. 
This heuristic is very useful but not very innovative by itself. When used in 
combination with approximate regular expressions broken into parts that 
allow for errors, it is an important piece of the puzzle to IE with in an OCR 
context.	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CHAPTER 10 
EFFECTS OF OCR ERRORS ON INFORMATION EXTRACTION USING  
 
FUZZY SHALLOW PARSING 
 
Collecting Documents With DOB Information 
For this study, documents on the web about people were needed. A popular 
list of the one hundred most influential people in history is detailed in Hart  
(1992). Each person’s named was googled and the first hit was considered 
as a candidate document. If the URL had a domain name previously seen 
then that URL was disqualified and the next document in the search query 
results was considered. This allowed a more random sampling of sites from 
the web. If we didn’t do this disqualification process, websites like Wikipedia 
would account for many of the documents and they all have too similar a 
writing style and formatting. 
The first page of each document was printed on a laser printer and 
scanned using a scanner, model CanoScan LiDE 200 from Cannon. The 
software package ScanSoft OmniPage SE OCR, provided with the scanner, 
was used for converting the scanned images into text files. The default scan 
resolution of 300 dots per inch with grey scale was used for the OCR soft-
ware. These setting, software, and hardware generated a much higher error 
rate than state-of-the-art OCR systems. Regardless, the errors are represen-
tative of many OCR collections in part because the initial image quality is 
sometimes very poor and leads to high error rate even with the state-of-the-
art OCR software with optimal settings. While the error rate is much higher 
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for the CanoScan system that a state-of-the-art system, the specific individ-
ual errors are of the same nature. At the end of this process, one hundred 
single page OCRed documents were created as a text files. 
The generation of the clean text documents was a little less straight-
forward. The files were saved as text using the web browser Firefox’s save as 
text feature. Some files were in UTF-8, ASCII, and ISO-8859 file formats. 
Some files had illegal byte sequences, which were manually removed. In 
some cases where the save text failed, the text was saved using cut and 
paste from the browser into a text editor. Not all of the HTML was removed 
from the text using Firefox. In particular, there are vestiges left over from 
hyperlinks and embedded pictures. It is pretty clear when date of birth 
matches happened on one of these lines, which happens less than five per-
cent of the time. These matches were not considered matches during the 
statistics collection of precision and recall. 
The line terminators were a mix of Window, Unix, and Mac formats. 
These were all normalized. This made viewing and verification efforts easier. 
Files were then manually trimmed to the first page, and parts of columns 
not visible on the first page removed. In some files, the HTML had no line 
breaks for the text and line breaks were added. The lines breaks were not 
matched up with the OCR text line-for-line, as this would take much man-
ual data entry work. 
All date of birth matches in both the OCR and clean text were assured 
to occur on a single line. This was done by manually editing of about five 
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percent of the matches. In a more commercial implementation as done in 
(Taghva, Coombs Pereda & Nartker, 2005), windows of text centered about 
key phrases would be used to isolate potential matches rather than examin-
ing the text line at a time. Brin (1998) used a similar simplification of ignor-
ing multi-line matches in his relation extraction study. No matches occurred 
across three or more lines in the original text, so at most a single newline 
was removed. 
Because a dash was used a key matching character, all instances of 
dashes were normalized to ASCII short dash. Even within the same docu-
ment before normalization, dashes were encoded with different Unicode se-
quences yet they might look nearly identical when visually displayed. 
Blind Testing on Both Clean and OCRed Text 
The DOB extractor was developed in two successive versions. For the first 
version, we built an extractor using the first 50 clean text documents. Be-
cause these web pages were carefully sampled from the entire Web, they 
represent a broad range of examples of all the possible text patterns for ex-
pressing DOB. The focus here was making sure we did not miss any birth 
dates, in other words no false negatives. For the second version, we added 
approximate matching limits for keyword based extraction patterns. The fo-
cus here was relaxing the constraints of the extraction patterns without in-
troducing so many false positives that the precision drops below 30%. Again 
only the first 50 documents were used for developing these extracting pat-
terns and arriving at approximate matching limits.  
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Once the different extraction patterns were developed, they were not 
allowed to be modified during blind testing. The testing was done the un-
seen last 50 clean documents and then last 50 OCRed documents. All the 
relevancy judgments were made on a line-by-line basis. There were roughly 
10K lines of clean text and 3K lines of OCR text across the 50 unseen doc-
uments. This difference in number of lines is due to the bloating the text 
when using Firefox’s save as text feature. Whitespace resembles the HTML 
source more than it resembles the whitespace of the HTML rendered. 
Precision And Recall Results 
Table 10.1  
Precision and Recall Results on 50 Unseen Clean Text Documents 
 
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 
tp: 37 fp: 16 tp: 41 fp: 1 
fn: 0 tn: 10442 fn: 0 tn: 10453 
precision: 69.81% recall: 100.00% precision: 97.62% recall: 100.00% 
  
 
Table 10.2  
Precision and Recall Results on 50 Unseen OCR Text Documents 
 
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 
tp: 35 fp: 29 tp: 36 fp: 109 
fn: 0 tn: 3109 fn: 3 tn: 3025 
precision: 54.69% recall: 100.00% precision: 24.83% recall: 92.31% 
  
 
 
For pattern 1, the recall remains 100% in the presence of OCR errors. 
The precision dropped 15.12%. The dash in the date range is never misrec-
ognized in the training or unseen documents. For this pattern, there was 
never a date that was so poorly recognized that there was not even a single 
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digit. A string of digits makes a good proxy for a date when combined with 
just a few more details for filtering out many of the false positives. We used 
the same exact pattern on the clean text and the OCR text. The precision is 
below 70% even on clean text. 
For pattern 2, the recall drops 7.69% in an OCR context. The preci-
sion dropped 72.79%. On the clean text we use exact matching of keywords. 
On the OCR text, we use approximate string matching. We don’t exactly 
predict the OCR errors; we just know that most of the OCR corrupt words 
will fall near the clean version of the word. We measure distance between 
OCRed and clean words using the Levenshtein distance, also known at the 
edit distance. 
There are three false negatives in three separate documents that pre-
vented a 100% recall on pattern 2 in the OCR text documents. The first one 
is attributed to a very small HTML font that caused the space character to 
be unrecognized. 
Clean Text:   
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born to Isaac Rousseau and Suzanne Bernard 
in Geneva on June 28, 1712 
OCR Text:   JacquesRousseaurvasborntolsaacRousseauandSuzauneBer-
nardinGenevaon.lune23. 1712. 
The second false negative was due to an unrecognized date because 
not a single digit was recognized correctly. 
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Clean Text:  
Vladimir Lenin was born Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov on April 10, 1870 
OCR Text:   
Vladimir l,enin was born Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov on April ro, rBTo 
 
For both the two errors above, they could have just as easily have ef-
fected pattern 1 because both patterns 1 and 2 use the same date recogni-
tion strategy. The last error occurred because the pattern in “b. at Taure-
sium in Illrium, May 11, 483;” where the date doesn’t not immediately follow 
the “b.” was not seen in the training data. A larger training data set would 
have captured this extraction pattern. 
Given that this is a relatively small document collection, any changes 
in precision or recall greater than 5% must be considered significant. Only 
recall for the pattern 1 remained unchanged with the introduction of OCR 
errors. There is an inverse relationship between recall and precision. A high 
recall is being maintained at the cost of a lower precision.  
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CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
HMM Information Extraction 
Our testing indicates that shrinkage does not significantly improve an 
HMMs performance for this task. In fact, there was some degradation. 
More interesting is the relative “success” of the default HMM. This 
may suggest that for OCR texts the structure of HMMs should be more 
flexible than that of the Freitag-McCallum HMM (figure 5.1). For example, 
perhaps there should be an additional “error state” accessible to all states 
with a low transition probability that would recognize addresses with “out of 
order” elements such as in the tagged data of figure 6.1. 
For our task, however, the “clean” HMM is preferable to the others. As 
discussed in at the starts of chapters 5, 7, and 9, correctly finding docu-
ments with private information is, to a certain degree, more important than 
mistakenly marking non-private documents as private. In other words, re-
call to a certain degree is more important than precision. Human review can 
make up for the lacking precision without too heavy a cost. 
Although Taghva, Borsack and Condit (1996a, 1996b) show that OCR 
errors do not affect the average effectiveness of information retrieval, some 
studies have indicated that noisy data can degrade information extraction 
tasks such as text summarization as reported by Jing, Lopresti, and Shih 
(2003). Our test results indicate that noisy data will also degrade tasks such 
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as searching a text for segments belonging to some specific category, such 
as addresses. 
There seems to be some “common sense” support for this conclusion. 
When retrieving OCR documents, a search engine will still have a large pro-
portion of the text available to it due to the high accuracy of OCR engines. 
However, information extraction requires that specific, localized patterns be 
found. If the very objects being sought have been lost to the OCR process, 
extraction will fail. We plan to further study the effects of OCR noise on IE 
tasks by comparing the performance of HMMs on clean and noisy text col-
lections in various IE tasks. 
We also hope to further investigate the variation of certain parameters 
of HMMs. For example, Freitag suggests a version of absolute discounting 
different from the one proposed by Borkar, Deshmukh, & Sarawagi (2001), 
which we used. We would like to determine in later experiments which is 
superior. 
IE using Precise Shallow Parsing 
In our applications, the extractors look for establishing a relationship be-
tween two entities, namely a person and a date.  A date in isolation is not 
private information.  Nor does it become private if it is identified as a birth 
date with an identifier such as date of birth. A date becomes private infor-
mation only when it is correctly associated with a person.  The date-of-birth 
identification is an example of relational extraction of the form E1 R E2, 
where Ei and R denote an entity and its relation, respectively.  Other exam-
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ples of relational extractions are authors and books are outline in Brin 
(1998) or acronyms and their definitions by Taghva and Gilbreth (1999).   
There are many known techniques for extracting relational informa-
tion from text. The most popular methods are a combination of Hidden 
Markov Model, dictionary look up, natural language pattern processing, and 
ad-hoc algorithms (Taghva, Borsack, and Condit, 1994 &1999; Taghva, 
Coombs, Pereda, and Nartker 2005). Our approach is an example of an ad-
hoc algorithm.  Our work implies that identification of documents contain-
ing PII can be done using IE techniques for date of birth information on 
OCRed document collections. The success rate is comparable to that of 
clean text document collection. With a remaining 5% not recalled, there is 
still room for improvement. The recall can be improved at the cost of de-
creased precision by allowing for recognition of page sized tables, and by 
considering larger training document sets. On a per-hit basis, the OCR er-
rors reduce recall to nearly 50% and precision to nearly 10%, making it not 
very useful. This is a very challenging problem if one wishes to perform an 
automatic redaction process. 
IE using Fuzzy Shallow Parsing 
Again, the objective of this experiment was to achieve a high recall of over 
95% with a reasonable precision of around 30%. For pattern 1, this was 
achieved with 54.69% precision and 100.00% recall. For pattern 2, this was 
nearly achieved with a 24.83% precision and 92.31% recall. We were within 
5.17% of this goal for precision and 2.69% for recall. With some more ex-
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perimentation with the approx-settings, there is some possibility of improv-
ing the precision of pattern 2. The 2 out of the 3 recall errors, or false nega-
tives, could just as easily have occurred during the testing of pattern 1. 
These errors were due to a very noisy OCR results where dates are unrecog-
nizable when relying on digit characters. This need was not foreseen in the 
training document set. The date extraction pattern could be improved by 
expanding the date pattern to include dates without numbers but with the 
names of months.  
The degree of OCR corruption in the unseen OCR documents was ex-
treme.  For example, in the date “April ro, rBTo” there are 6 errors in the 
span of just 14 characters. In a state-of-the-art OCR document repository, 
such as the LSN, the density of errors per token would be less than half that 
error rate. In these situations, fuzzy information extraction will meet up 
with fewer unrecoverable errors, and prove more robust than shown here. 
In future studies, we will develop a systematic approach to setting the 
edit distance error counts for a given pattern.  The length of the patterns, 
the make up of the words within the document set, and the degree of OCR 
corruption within the collection will play a critical role in determining the 
optimal error counts. Characterizing the attainable levels of precision and 
recall will guide IE in an OCR context projects. 
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OCR Effects on IE 
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Figure 11.2 Precision Recall Plot of OCR Effects 
 
The above plot summarizes three studies on information extraction in 
an OCR context. The starting point of each arrow marks the precision and 
recall on clean text; the end point marks the precision and recall after OCR 
errors. The first study in red is the on the IE system based on Hidden Mar-
kov Models. There is a small decrease in precision but also a surprising 
small increase in precision. Theoretically, perhaps the HMM generalized bet-
ter with the noisy OCR training data. This was a complex system and did 
not easily lead itself to detailed internal analysis of the errors. This could 
also be a case of cargo cult science (Feyman, 1974 & 1985) where the ex-
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pected results appear in the data. The blue arrows represent precise shallow 
parsing. The small blue arrows shows a small decrease in recall after the in-
troduction of OCR errors. The large blue arrow shows a large decrease in 
precision and a moderate decrease in recall. Here the precision and recall is 
properly measured per hit, rather than per document. Both the green ar-
rows measure fuzzy shallow parsing IE measured per hit. Pattern 1 matches 
date of birth patterns with a keyword; pattern 2 matches date of birth pat-
terns with a date range. In one case, we see no decrease in recall and in the 
other only a slight decrease in recall. In one case, there is a slight decrease 
in precision and the other a moderate. Roughly, for the shallow parsing 
techniques, it seems we can trade-off precision for recall when adapting IE 
systems to OCR errors. 
The code for the HMM extractor was written as part of a team of re-
searchers. The code for the shallow parsing programs was written by this 
author and was, of course, certainly his best effort. The precise shallow 
parsing extractor was evaluated independently of the author. The results of 
the three studies are intended to give an empirical gauge of the quality of 
information extraction results on a large variety documents that have been 
OCRed.  
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Conclusions 
We’ve shown that formal extraction methodologies based on the Hid-
den Markov Models are not robust enough to deal with extraction in an OCR 
environment. We also shown that both precise shallow parsing and fuzzy 
shallow parsing can be used to increase the recall at the price of significant 
drop in the precision. These result are in stark contrast to IR system that 
function well without modification in an OCR environment.  
The Hidden Markov Model system was built by a team that had as 
many as ten employees. The team included two dedicated data entry work-
ers, a half dozen programmers, two professors, and more. The system was 
the emperor’s new software, like his clothes. The HMM could have been 
tested more objectively. The shallow parsing system was tested in a very ad-
versarial manner because it was not as sophisticated, and fared well. Now, 
one can dare say that the emperor has no clothes. The hidden structure of 
this particular HMM turned out to be the directly observable in the linear 
sequence of lexical tokens. The shallow parsing techniques were much sim-
pler solutions that worked: solved a real problem on real data. Sometimes 
problem solving and appearing sophisticated are competing goals. Cargo 
cult science is an easy mistake to make with Hidden Markov Models. 
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